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OF OBESITY LAWS
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Traditional law and economic analysis considers how laws directly
incentivize socially optimal behaviors.
Meanwhile, a growing
theoretical literature posits that beyond deterrence or incentives, laws
also communicate normative judgments that can have effects
unanticipated by classical predictions. This Article presents empirical
evidence supporting the broader legal theory that laws can express
social values, leading to shifts in social norms. Using data on
adolescent peer networks in the United States, I find that where antiobesity policies are stricter, social stigma increases for obese girls,
though obesity rates do not necessarily decrease. These results are
robust and consistent with a model in which the obese, in an anti-obesity
policy environment, are negatively perceived as exerting less effort in
their health than their non-obese peers. I explore implications of this
stigma.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Classical law and economic theory analyzes legal rules by focusing
on their deterrence or direct incentive effects and by evaluating whether
or not such legal incentives would produce socially optimal outcomes.
At the same time, a burgeoning body of scholarship argues that laws,
from public health policies to criminalization statutes to consumption
taxes, can tacitly express powerful normative statements in addition to
imposing direct incentives.1 Such laws are theorized to interact with
people’s preferences and to induce a shift in social norms. The concern,
then, is that these legal statements motivate unanticipated responses that
may enhance or impede policymakers’ original goals, depending on the
social network in question. While existing literature is rich in theory,
there is a dearth of empirical studies on the law and economics of social
norms.
This Article contributes empirical evidence addressing the broader
legal theory that laws express values and shift social norms by studying
the case of obesity-related laws and their relationship with peer group
norms. Like many public health laws, anti-obesity policies typically
have goals of incentivizing healthy behaviors to reduce health risks
among the aggregate population. But do such obesity-related laws
communicate values that also lead to social stigma of obese or
1. Examples include mandatory sex education revealing an acceptance of teen sex as a norm, or
priority flu vaccinations of children as revealing how the state values children’s lives above adults’
lives. See, e.g., Robin Pierce, The Expressive Function of Public Health Policy: The Case of Pandemic
Planning, 4 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53 (2011); Kerry Taylor & Roxanne Mykitiuk, Genetics, Normalcy
and Disability, 2 ISUMA: CANADIAN J. POL’Y RES. 65 (2001).
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overweight persons? Indeed, especially among female adolescents,
social pressures to conform to norms in body weight can be significant
in U.S. schools, and obese youth experience higher likelihoods of being
bullied compared to normal weight youth.2 Beyond bullying, obesity
stigma has been documented to translate to further disadvantages in
society. Relative to non-obese persons, obese persons are susceptible to
discrimination and are worse off in education, employment, the
marriage market, happiness, and health care, among other areas.3
In policy terms, such consequences warrant greater attention as the
obesity epidemic has emerged as a significant public health threat in
recent decades. The rise in obesity rates since the 1980s, particularly
among youth,4 has spurred alarm not only about the health status of a
growing population but also about the financial costs associated with
obesity amid an increasingly expensive health care system.5 In
response, lawmakers have proposed a number of interventions in
society,6 such as levying taxes, requiring nutrition education, and
revamping school lunches. Previous studies have evaluated the laws’
effects on reducing body weight, though little is known about the stigma
consequences.
To formalize my analysis, I present a simple economic model that
explores one mechanism of obesity stigma amid variation in health laws.
A hypothesis is that anti-obesity policies that encourage taking
responsibility of one’s own weight-related behaviors can further
stigmatize obese persons.7 Namely, the model suggests that obese
persons, in an anti-obesity policy environment expressing values of

2. See, e.g., Richard S. Strauss & Harold A. Pollack, Social Marginalization of Overweight
Children, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 746 (2003).
3. See Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and Update, 17
OBESITY 941, 943–47 (2009).
4. Among youths ages six to nineteen, the prevalence of obesity has more than tripled since
1980, with 16.5 percent classified as obese in 2002. Combating youth obesity has emerged as a theme,
most recently publicized by Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” campaign to promote healthy eating and
physical activity. Learn the Facts, LET’S MOVE, http://www.letsmove.gov/learn-facts/epidemicchildhood-obesity (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). Heeding the advice of public health experts, Obama’s
initiative emphasizes strategies to reduce cost barriers to healthy lifestyles. Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Childhood Obesity Battle Taken up by First Lady, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A16.
5. The health consequences of obesity are costly, reaching $147 billion in 2008, or almost 10
percent of all U.S. medical expenditures. Eric A. Finkelstein, Justin G. Trogdon, Joel W. Cohen, &
William Dietz, Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer- and Service-specific
Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. W822 (2009).
6. Anti-obesity interventions may include educational campaigns on diet and nutrition;
regulation of physical activity of schoolchildren, nutritional labeling requirements, and the so-called “fat
tax” on soft drinks and junk foods.
7. See Taryn Parker-Pope, Fat Stigma Spreads around the Globe, N.Y. TIMES: WELL BLOG
(Mar. 30, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/spreading-fat-stigma-around-theglobe/.
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personal responsibility, are negatively perceived as exerting less effort
in their health than their non-obese peers. Though this model of effort is
not the only explanation of why obesity stigma arises, it characterizes a
plausible mechanism describing how expressive health laws might
motivate to real changes in behavior.
Next, I empirically document the relationship between health laws
with obesity norms. Taking advantage of a nationally representative
dataset of adolescent peer networks across U.S. schools,8 I analyze
social stigma and academic outcomes of obese girls amid policies that
are hypothesized to affect obesity. For anti-obesity policies, I use state
dietary and nutrition education mandates, which are among a broader
class of programs directly aimed at reducing obesity among youth. To
be clear, this focus on mandates does not deny the powerful roles of the
media and culture in stigmatizing persons who deviate from the “ideal”
body weight. Media effects are likely to be national in scope, though
cultural standards may vary. To minimize such biases from cultural or
media influences, the regression analysis controls for demographic,
school-level, and neighborhood variables.
This analysis offers original evidence that links stricter anti-obesity
laws to more obesity stigma. To further develop the analysis, I consider
how the law’s expressive effects vary by pre-existing norms, since
underlying weight norms may differ by culture or by whether one is
obese relative to one’s peers. To implement this analysis, I employ the
demographic composition that varies idiosyncratically across peer
groups (cohorts) in schools.
My results are consistent with the predictions of legal theory. I find
that obese adolescent women experience harsher social stigma amid
well-intentioned policies that aim to reduce obesity in the larger
population. Where anti-obesity dietary education laws are stricter,
social stigma increases for obese girls. On the other hand, the education
penalty that obese women experience is mitigated under anti-obesity
laws. I also find that efforts to engage in healthier behaviors are slightly
higher under more demanding dietary education mandates, though
obesity does not decrease. Finally, pre-existing norms could matter;
being surrounded by more white peers as well as being surrounded by
more obese peers correspond to less social stigma from anti-obesity law.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the model in which the
obese, in an anti-obesity policy environment favoring personal
responsibility over one’s own health, are negatively perceived as
exerting less effort in their health than their non-obese peers. While
8. In evaluating the social norms of health laws, school-based, peer network data are especially
useful, since the lives of adolescents often center on school, where there is heightened awareness of
social norms. Robert Crosnoe, Gender, Obesity, and Education, 80 SOC. EDUC. 241, 244 (2007).
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these estimates should not be viewed as definitive of a causal
relationship, they do shed light on the law’s role in shaping norms and
preferences, an area where thus far, data work has been scarce and
costly to pursue.
The implications extend beyond health laws. The upshot is that the
predictions of expressive legal theory warrant practical attention. That
is, policymakers should more seriously consider the social norm
outcomes of laws, especially those that may vary by pre-existing norms.
In the case of obesity, a shift in weight norms can manifest in
educational or employment differentials, which lie outside of the law’s
formally incentivized outcomes. Thus, it may be more effective to
calibrate a law by taking into account stigma effects that vary by
subgroups.
Part II gives background on the law and economics of social norms.
Part III explains the application of the theory to obesity and presents a
simple model of expressive obesity law and stigma. Part IV tests this
question empirically, describing the data and econometric estimation,
and discussing the results in stigma outcomes. It also considers
educational and policy implications of obesity stigma and the social
norm outcomes of laws generally. Part V concludes.
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS
A. Review of Legal Theory
Recall that positive law and economics theory is grounded in
analyzing the direct incentive effects of the law. To be more specific,
this refers to the idea that the law can motivate an outcome by imposing
costs or payoffs that make particular behaviors more attractive than
others. This idea is traditionally applied in the analysis of criminal and
tort laws. For example in criminal law, statutes that impose mandatory
fines for driving over the speed limit are thought to deter reckless
speeding by increasing the expected costs of driving too fast.9 In tort
law, rationales for large punitive damage awards, such as in medical
malpractice, state that such precedents would incentivize greater levels
of precaution and deter future accidents.
Since the mid-1990s, however, a substantial movement in legal
scholarship has generated theories that recognize that laws can have
effects beyond those expected from their “carrot and stick” approaches.
Incorporating analyses of social norms, legal scholars such as Cass
9. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Michael Greenstone, Using Mandated Speed Limits to
Measure the Value of a Statistical Life, 112 J. POL. ECON. S226 (2004).
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Sunstein,10 Richard McAdams,11 and Dan Kahan12 have categorized
such non-incentive roles as the “expressive” function of law. The most
simplified version of the theory holds that such non-incentive effects
arise when laws express what the government values or what it believes
should be the social norm.13 For example, laws that criminalize
marijuana possession can be construed as expressing the view that
marijuana use is morally wrong. The law’s role in conveying this
message would be independent of its direct deterrent function in
increasing private costs of marijuana possession via criminal sentencing.
In terms of norms, the theory holds that the law can communicate
what the social norm is, and in doing so, the law shapes individual
preferences and behaviors. Because people prefer not to deviate too
much from existing social norms, they will adjust their behaviors to
conform to the norm (or to come closer to a position that they prefer
relative to the norm).14 This leads to compliance with the law,
regardless of the actual or expected private costs of breaking the law.15
Thus, criminalizing marijuana would convey the norm that marijuana is
“bad.” According to the theory, since most people do not want to be
“bad,” they will refrain from smoking pot, even though the expected
10. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25
(1996) (characterizing this as “the function of law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling
behavior directly”, and focusing on how policymakers might apply this function in changing social
norms).
11. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339,
340 (2000).
12. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996). See
also Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul Slovic, Who Fears the
HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural
Cognition, 34 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 501, 502 (2009) (surmising that the controversy over HPV
vaccination may arise from concerns that the policy would be “an expression of moral or political values
unrelated to the efficacy of the vaccine”).
13. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995).
14. Sunstein writes that norms themselves are powerful in influencing risky behaviors such as
drug use, cigarette smoking, and diet and exercise. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 2033–34.
15. While most models predict compliance, it is also possible for expressive functions to have
the opposite effect, such as inducing backlash against the law. See, e.g., Daniel L. Chen, Vardges
Levonyan, & Susan Yeh, Do Policies Affect Preferences? Evidence from Random Variation in Abortion
Jurisprudence (2012) (manuscript), available at http://nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Abortion.pdf. Or, there
may be no genuinely expressive effects. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1375–76 (2000) (asserting that the existing expressive
theories of law, which rely on law’s linguistic meaning, fail to prove that the law is truly expressive
according to moral theories); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000). Moreover, expressive functions or social norms can be inefficient.
See Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1722 (1996)
(arguing that social norms can produce negative externalities that hurt third parties); Alex Geisinger, Are
Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57
ALA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (applying social and cognitive psychology to analyze when norms may be
inefficient).
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sanctions may not be harsh enough to deter smoking if a person does not
care about being “bad.”16
Further models and extensions more precisely explain mechanisms of
the law’s expressive effects and the role of social norms. McAdams’s
attitudinal theory highlights the role of information and beliefs; it
proposes that the law signals public attitudes about what behaviors are
appropriate, that people will update their beliefs about these attitudes,
and that they will comply with the law to avoid public disapproval.17
Similarly, Dharmapala and McAdams write that laws reveal information
about the riskiness of a behavior (such as a smoking ban revealing that
the government estimates smoking to be more dangerous than the public
thinks), and people will update their beliefs to incorporate that new
information.18 Benabou and Tirole present formal microeconomic
models that explain how laws may shift preferences as people update
beliefs with the law; they propose that individuals will change their
actions as the law informs them whether their prior preferences relative
to the norm make them more likely to experience honor (or stigma).19
Notably, game theory20 has also been applied to explain expressive
effects.21 Both Cooter and McAdams, for example, highlight the idea
that law reveals a “focal point” about the coordination strategy that may

16. Social scientists who study crime have also considered the “broken windows theory,” which
argues that disorder in urban environments foster norms that result in urban crimes. See generally,
GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND
REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 16–27 (1996).
17. According to Richard H. McAdams:
[P]eople care about attitudes of approval and disapproval, but make mistakes about such
matters; legislation is correlated with public attitudes so that the enactment of legislation
provides a signal of public attitudes; and those who observe the signal will update their
prior beliefs about public attitudes in the direction of expecting more disapproval for
behavior the law condemns. Expecting disapproval for the behavior provides an
incentive, independent of legal sanctions, to comply with the law.
McAdams, supra note 11, at 372.
18. See Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1 (2003).
19. See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Law and Norms, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17579 2011).
20. In a game theoretic model, individuals choose the best strategies to optimize their payoffs
given the other players’ best strategies; depending on the payoff structures, this may mean that a player
is better off not cooperating with others lest he be hurt even more by other players who do not
cooperate. But under certain conditions, such as in a repeated game over a longer time horizon, the
optimal strategy may be to cooperate with others. See generally ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR
APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992) (introduces basic concepts of game theory and their extensions); MARTIN
J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY (1994) (provides mathematical proofs
of strategic and cooperative games).
21. See, e.g., CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS
OF SOCIAL NORMS (2006); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1649 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998).
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exist among individuals in society.22 Thus, when people become aware
of the law, they adjust their preferences accordingly in order to uphold
the equilibrium coordination strategy and continue to maximize their
payoffs overall.23
B. Empirical Literature
Despite this wave of scholarship, there exist only a handful of
empirical studies that test the expressivist theories with real-world laws
and data. The following studies test the theories directly. First, a key
study by Funk analyzes mandatory voting laws over time and across
cantons in Switzerland, where fines for noncompliance were so small as
to render the laws “symbolic.”24 Observing that cantons that removed
the voting laws saw lower voter turnout compared to others, Funk
concludes that the laws had an expressive function independent of
deterrence.25 Second, Fox and Griffin argue that the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) expressed negative messages about persons with
disabilities by linking its enactment with a reduction in the birthrate of
babies with Down syndrome.26 Third, Kotsadam and Jacobssen find no
changes in attitudes about prostitution following the enactment of a
Norwegian law criminalizing buying sex.27 Finally, Chen, Levonyan,
and Yeh model changes in political preferences following exogenous
changes in abortion policy across appellate jurisdictions and find causal,
empirical evidence of political backlash, contrary to the standard
predictions of expressivist theories.28 None of these studies, however,
makes the case that they are directly characterizing norms shared across
a population with a common network. By directly analyzing the
relationship between law and social norms using peer networks, this
Article contributes original evidence where theory is rich but data work
is scarce.

22. Cooter, supra note 21, at 586, 593–96; McAdams, supra note 21, at 1651–52.
23. Cooter, supra note 21, at 595. But see Posner, supra note 15, at 1713–19 (suggesting
conditions where strategic behavior can undermine coordination and render norms inefficient).
24. Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting
Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM L. & ECON. REV. 135, 139 (2007).
25. Id. at 138.
26. See Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 845 (2009).
27. See Andreas Kotsadam & Niklas Jakobsson, Do Laws Affect Attitudes? An Assessment of the
Norwegian Prostitution Law Using Longitudinal Data, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 103 (2011).
28. See Chen, Levonyan, & Yeh, supra note 15.
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III. OBESITY APPLICATION
Social norms regarding body weight can be a very visible fact of life
in the United States, with abundant media images favoring slimmer
body figures and an extensive industry surrounding diet and weight loss.
Yet recent years have witnessed growing alarm over an “obesity
epidemic” in the United States, which is one of the heaviest nations in
the world, in terms of average body weight.29 By now, the average
American is overweight, and over one-third of Americans are classified
as clinically obese30 and are at heightened risk of serious healththreatening conditions such as diabetes and heart failure.31
In view of these problems, policymakers at the national, state, and
local levels have called for a “war on obesity.” Recent initiatives have
explicitly targeted childhood obesity, sometimes quite aggressively.32
Georgia, for example, posted billboards announcing, “Chubby kids may
not outlive their parents” and “Big bones didn’t make me this way. Big
meals did.”33 Most prominent has been First Lady Michelle Obama’s
“Let’s Move” campaign, which was launched in tandem with President
Barack Obama’s creation of a Task Force on Childhood Obesity.
Calling childhood obesity a “national health crisis,”34 this campaign
proposed to reduce obesity in a generation by encouraging healthy
eating and exercise, as well as by monitoring the body mass index
(BMI) of children.35
Could such anti-obesity initiatives shift norms and preferences in
body weight? Critics have been vocal in arguing that official policies
emphasizing the harms of obesity could further stigmatize obese

29. Obesity and Economics of Prevention: Fit not Fat—United States Key Facts, ORG. FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
AND
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33929_46038969_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Jan. 29, 2013).
30. Overweight and Obesity: Adult Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013); Cynthia J. Stein
& Graham A. Colditz, The Epidemic of Obesity, 89 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM
2522, 2522 (2004).
31. See Aviva Must, Jennifer Spadano, Eugenie H. Coakley, Alison E. Field, Graham Colditz &
William H. Dietz, The Disease Burden Associated with Overweight and Obesity, 282 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1523 (1999); Ali H. Mokdad, Earl S. Ford, Barbara A. Bowman, William H. Dietz, Frank
Vinicor, Virginia S. Bales & James S. Marks, Prevalence Of Obesity, Diabetes, and Obesity-Related
Health Risk Factors, 2001, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 76 (2003).
32. See, e.g., David Crary, Amid “War on Obesity,” Skeptics Warn of Stigma, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 2, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42770308/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition/t/amid-warobesity-skeptics-warn-stigma/.
33. Id.
34. See
THE
CHALLENGE
WE
FACE,
LET’S
MOVE!,
available
at
http://www.letsmove.gov/sites/letsmove.gov/files/TFCO_Challenge_We_Face.pdf.
35. See Learn the Facts, supra note 4.
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persons.36 “Fat Acceptance” advocates maintain that initiatives like
“Let’s Move” that put negative attention on obese children are likely to
worsen their encounters with discrimination and bullying in schools, and
later, at work and in society.37 In fact, one law professor blogged that
the program essentially was communicating that “the way to stop the
bullying of fat kids is to get rid of fat kids.”38 Despite the original
intentions to improve health in the aggregate, “the claim can be made
that it is in fact supporting childhood bullying, suggesting the
‘otherness’ (e.g., size, shape, and/or weight) that children’s peers display
or perform is not passable in terms of embodiment or by way of the
implications of Michelle Obama’s initiative.”39
These critiques highlight a real-world application of the law and
economics of social norms to the timely public health issue of obesity.
Certainly, observers have noted the role of social norms in public health
interventions in general and that stigma surrounding some diseases can
make public health policies a challenge to implement effectively.40 A
legitimate worry is that persons infected with HIV may be reluctant to
reveal their disease status and that the epidemic may then go
underground.41 Skeptics of HIV disclosure laws argue that imposing
criminal penalties for hiding one’s disease status might further increase
the stigma of infected persons,42 while not necessarily reducing risky
health behaviors as the laws were intended to do.43 These comments
36. See, e.g., Parker-Pope, supra note 7 (surmising that the emergence of fat stigma around the
world may also result from public health efforts to promote obesity as a disease and a worrisome threat
to a nation’s health); Jenny A. Armentrout, Sugar, Salt, and Fat: Michelle Obama’s Rhetoric
Concerning the Let’s Move! Initiative: Binary Opposition, Weight Obsession, and the Obesity Paradox
128-9
(Aug.
2011)
(Ph.D.
dissertation),
available
at
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/sendpdf.cgi/Armentrout%20Jenny%20A.pdf?bgsu1307554274&dl=y; Crary, supra note 32.
37. Crary, supra note 32.
38. Paul Campos, Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move Campaign is Helping Bullies, THE DAILY
BEAST, MAR. 15, 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/16/michelle-obamas-childhoodobesity-lets-move-campaign-helps-bullies.html.
39. Armentrout, supra note 36, at 129.
40. See, e.g., Scott Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
179 (2002); Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, Obesity Stigma: Important Considerations for
Public Health, 100 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 1019, 1019–20 (2010) (giving historical examples of disease
stigma surrounding persons with cholera or tuberculosis).
41. Burris, supra note 40, at 179.
42. Catherine Dodds & Peter Keogh, Criminal Prosecutions for HIV Transmission: People
Living with HIV Respond, 17 INT’L J. STD & AIDS 315, 317 (2006) (finding that HIV-infected persons
perceive more stigma under HIV disclosure laws). Cf. Gregory M. Herek, John P. Capitanio & Keith F.
Widaman, Stigma, Social Risk, and Health Policy: Public Attitudes Toward HIV Surveillance Policies
and the Social Construction of Illness, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 533, 533, 535 (2003) (finding that
perceptions of stigma could affect people’s decisions to be tested for HIV).
43. Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial, 39
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 467, 468 (2007) (concluding that HIV disclosure laws fail to “influence people’s
normative beliefs about risky sex” upon finding no differences in risky sexual behaviors between people
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suggest that understanding the expressive functions of laws is essential
for improving health policy.44 By investigating whether normative
messages of health laws could further disfavor obese persons in society,
this Article addresses the need for empirical evidence on expressive
functions of public health laws. Below provides a background on
obesity and explains the application of expressive law and economics to
obesity.
A. Laws Relevant to Obesity
While a national campaign like “Let’s Move” has inspired public
awareness, it is merely one of many anti-obesity interventions that
policymakers have implemented or proposed in the past two decades.
Certainly, consumption taxes and direct regulations on unhealthy
behaviors have emerged, with variation across local and state
jurisdictions. Taxes on high-calorie soft drinks and snack foods, as well
as taxes levied on people merely for being obese,45 have generated many
debates, not only about their effectiveness in reducing weight, but also
about the government’s appropriate role in influencing individuals’ food
choices. In light of anxiety about obesity rates, direct government
interventions have included overhauls of unhealthy school lunch
programs, mandates for dietary and nutrition education, mandates for
more physical education, moratoriums on opening fast food restaurants
in neighborhoods,46 and requirements to monitor individuals’ BMI.47
in a state with an HIV disclosure law and in a state without an HIV disclosure law).
44. See, e.g., Robin Pierce, The Expressive Function of Public Health Policy: The Case of
Pandemic Planning, 4 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53 (2011).
45. See Matt Sloane, Alabama to Link Premium Costs to Workers’ Health, CNN, Sept. 19, 2008,
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-19/health/alabama.obesity.insurance_1_unhealthy-employeesscreening-plan (reporting about Alabama imposing a health insurance surcharge on state employees who
are obese or have high blood pressure starting in 2010); STATE OF ALABAMA, WELLNESS PREMIUM
DISCOUNT
PROGRAM,
available
at
http://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIP/SEHIPWellnessPremiumDiscount.pdf; Crary, supra note 32
(reporting about “Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer’s recent proposal to levy a $50 fee on state Medicaid
recipients who are obese and don’t follow a doctor-supervised slimming regimen”). Since 2008, Japan
has also levied similar fines on health insurance providers who failed to adequately screen their
participants’ waistlines or who failed to reduce them among patients whose waistlines exceeded the
government guidelines. See Norimitsu Onishi, Japan, Seeking Trim Waists, Decides to Measures
Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, at A1.
46. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Panel OKs Fast-Food Curbs, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2008, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/23/local/me-fastfood23.
47. Researchers have identified factors contributing to obesity rates that could justify such policy
interventions. See generally Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Do School Lunches Contribute to
Childhood Obesity?, 44 J. HUM. RESOURCES 684 (2009) (evaluating the National School Lunch
Program’s effects on childhood obesity, with policy implications for reforming school lunch offerings).
In practice, many programs’ actual impacts on obesity or improving health outcomes are open to further
study.
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1. Direct Incentive Effects
Many weight and food-related laws are designed to discourage
obesity by increasing the costs of unhealthy habits or decreasing the
costs of healthy habits. But unlike the most recent anti-obesity publicity
campaigns, the majority of these taxes and regulations do not so
explicitly promote negative images of the obese. In that way, such laws
may be more appropriate for testing expressivist theories because they
allow us to differentiate more clearly between a law’s incentive function
(e.g., raising dollar costs of unhealthy habits or lowering information
costs of healthy habits) and its expressive function (shifting social norms
or unexpectedly affecting social stigma).
With the high health care costs of treating conditions associated with
obesity, it is reasonable that the deterrence or incentive effects of
obesity-related laws have been of interest to health economists and
policymakers ex post, even if the laws did not explicitly target obesity.
For instance, because they would raise the cost of high-calorie drinks to
consumers, soda taxes are often considered as an anti-obesity strategy,
even though at first, some of the taxes were “applied primarily for
revenue generation.”48 Typically, when evaluating the policy incentives,
the outcomes of interest are related to body weight. In this vein and
drawing from previous analyses of sin taxes on cigarette and alcohol
consumption, studies have documented that state-level soda taxes49
decrease soda consumption by children and adolescents while increasing
their consumption of other high-calorie products;50 the links with
obesity rates are unclear.51
Likewise, states, school districts, and schools vary in their health
policies governing, among others, school breakfast and lunch choices,
healthy food preparation, junk food advertising, physical education, and
nutrition education.52 Each of these policies would shift incentives,
48. Lisa M. Powell et al., Associations Between State-level Soda Taxes and Adolescent Body
Mass Index, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S57, S58 (2009).
49. Soda tax rates range from zero to seven percent, with a mean tax rate of 3.43% in grocery
stores and 4.02% through vending machines. Soda tax rates vary by state, with the majority of states
levying a tax on soda sold in grocery stores or through vending machines. Id.
50. Jason M. Fletcher, David E. Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, The Effect of Soft Drink Taxes on
Child and Adolescent Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 967, 973 (2010).
51. See Daniel Kim & Ichiro Kawachi, Food Taxation and Pricing Strategies to “Thin Out” the
Obesity Epidemic, 30 AM J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 430, 432–33 (2006) (finding a link between repealing
a soda or snack food tax and higher obesity prevalence but no statistically significant relationship
between state soda tax rates and adult obesity rates); Powell et al., supra note 48, at S57 (finding
statistically insignificant relationships between soda tax rates and adolescent BMI and only a weakly
significant relationship with the “BMI among teens at risk for overweight”).
52. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS
STUDY
2006
(2006);
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/shpps/2006/factsheets/pdf/FS_Overview_SHPPS2006.pdf.
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often through higher or lower economic costs. For example, requiring
that reduced-price school lunch programs offer skim milk in addition to
whole milk53 would lower the costs of a healthier diet because the
person could more easily obtain the skim milk at the reduced lunch rate
rather than paying a higher price at a supermarket, as well as paying for
gasoline and time. How exactly is providing cheaper skim milk serving
a “deterrent function”? Quite simply, this policy makes it easier to
comply with healthy eating goals and discourages unhealthy eating by
increasing the relative cost of choosing whole milk when skim milk is
now just as inexpensive. An analogous reasoning applies to state
regulations on dietary and nutrition education in schools, which Part
III(B) discusses.
2. Obesity Stigma and the Expressive Function of Laws
The critiques of the anti-obesity campaigns suggest that such laws
might express messages about acceptable behaviors or physical
appearances independently of their direct incentives or penalties. In
assessing whether or not obesity-related laws shift social norms, this
Article focuses on the social acceptance and stigma that obese persons
experience amid such laws.
It is no secret that for some time, obese persons have been regarded
with disdain in American society, facing stereotypes such as being lazy,
lacking self-control, and lacking intelligence.54 In schools, anecdotes of
obese children being the victims of taunts and bullying based on their
weight are common.55
Obese students also mention feeling
dissatisfaction about their body sizes compared to societal ideals.56 At
work, obese persons often experience bias based on their weight and
appearance in the form of more severe wage penalties and employment

53. For example, as of 2006, 6 states and the District of Columbia require that schools to offer
three or more different types of milk for lunch, and 12 states recommend it. CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, STATE-LEVEL SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES AND PRACTICES: A STATE-BYSTATE SUMMARY FROM THE SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES AND PROGRAMS STUDY 2006, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/shpps/2006/summaries/pdf/State_Level_Summaries_SHPPS2006.pdf
54. Puhl & Heuer, supra note 40, at 1019.
55. Studies have documented students’ tendencies to bully their overweight peers. See Julie C.
Lumeng et al., Weight Status as a Predictor of Being Bullied in Third Through Sixth Grades, 125
PEDIATRICS e1301 (2010); Ian Janssen, Wendy M. Craig, William F. Boyce & William Pickett,
Associations Between Overweight and Obesity with Bullying Behaviors in School-Aged Children, 113
PEDIATRICS 1187 (2004); Richard S. Strauss & Harold A. Pollack, Social Marginalization of
Overweight Children, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 746 (2003).
56. See, e.g., Kristen Harrison, Ourselves, Our Bodies: Thin-Ideal Media, Self-Discrepancies,
and Eating Disorder Symptomatology in Adolescents, 20 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 289 (2001);
Janet D. Latner et al, Stigmatized Students: Age, Sex, and Ethnicity Effects in the Stigmatization of
Obesity, 13 OBESITY RESEARCH 1226 (2005).
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barriers on average;57 the wage penalties are especially pronounced
among white women who are obese.58 Obese patients are also more
likely to face derogatory comments and negative attitudes from doctors,
nurses, and other medical workers in health care settings.59
In view of the stereotypes about obese people, it is plausible that an
anti-obesity policy could adversely affect their positions relative to the
government’s desired norms. Indeed, psychologists have conducted
smaller experimental studies to determine the causes of bias against
obesity, which could inform anti-obesity policies and their
consequences. Other researchers have found that cues emphasizing the
internal, controllable causes of obesity worsened negative attitudes
about obesity,60 while cues emphasizing external factors such as
genetics improved attitudes.61 In fact, the framing of cost-equivalent
incentives can matter to health policymakers looking to navigate stigma.
An online experiment indicated that increasing health care premiums for
overweight persons signaled negative messages about being overweight,
while providing a credit of the same dollar amount for non-overweight
persons did not signal such messages to participants in the experiment.62
As such, these findings could help justify critics’ arguments that the
aggressive anti-obesity educational campaigns would worsen obesity
stigma, with their cues blaming obese people for being unable to control
their behaviors. However, the small-scale experimental results have
been mixed,63 and the expressive roles of actual laws on norms remain
untested in larger populations.

57. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting and Coping with Weight
Stigma: An Investigation of Overweight and Obese Adults, 14 OBESITY 1802 (2006); John Cawley, The
Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 451 (2004).
58. See Cawley, supra note 57, at 457; S. Averett & S. Korenman, Black-White Differences in
Social and Economic Consequences of Obesity, 23 INT’L J. OBESITY 166, 166 (1999).
59. See Puhl & Heuer, supra note 3, at 943–47 (2009).
60. Rebecca M. Puhl, Marlene B. Schwartz & Kelly D. Brownell, Impact of Perceived
Consensus on Stereotypes About Obese People: A New Approach for Reducing Bias, 24 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 517, 523 (2005).
61. Christian S. Crandall, Prejudice Against Fat People: Ideology and Self-Interest, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 882 (1994).
62. See David Tannenbaum, Chad L. Valasek, Eric D. Knowles & Peter H. Ditto, Work
Wellness Programs: Sticks Send Stigmatizing Signals 12–13 (manuscript), available at
https://webfiles.uci.edu/dtannenb/www/documents/Stick%20paper.pdf.
63. See, e.g., Stephen K. Bell & Sam B. Morgan, Children’s Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions
Toward a Peer Presented as Obese: Does a Medical Explanation for the Obesity Make a Difference?,
25 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 137 (2000) (finding that information explaining obesity had mixed effects on
children’s attitudes towards obese peers); Bethany A. Teachman, Kathrine D. Gapinski, Kelly D.
Brownell, Melissa Rawlins & Subathra Jeyaram, Demonstrations of Implicit Anti-Fat Bias: The Impact
of Providing Causal Information and Evoking Empathy, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 68, 68 (2003) (finding
higher bias when subjects were told that obesity was mainly caused by overeating and lack of exercise,
but not lower bias when subjects were told that obesity was mainly due to genetic factors).
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B. Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition Education Laws
To test the law and economic theories of social norms, this Article
analyzes dietary behaviors and nutrition education policies, which vary
across states. By 1994, 69% of states required high schools to offer
instruction on dietary behaviors and nutrition as part of their health
education curricula.64 According to a survey of high school health
teachers, this most likely includes teaching about “nutrients and the
foods where they are found (72.7%), choosing healthy meals and snacks
(72.6%),” as well as teaching about “social pressures to be thin (66.8%)”
and “healthy weight management (63.2%).”65 Appendix Table 9
summarizes the laws by state.
There are several reasons to focus on nutrition education laws when
testing legal theories of social norms. First, incentives to eat healthily
are embedded in the laws. All other things equal, nutrition education in
schools would reduce the time spent on seeking information and lower
the overall cost of information and, at least at the margin, make it easier
to make healthier decisions and achieve a healthy weight. Put another
way, they make unhealthy diets relatively less attractive and in theory
could “deter” obesity.66 Next, as with the recent anti-obesity awareness
campaigns, the nutrition education laws can potentially have expressive
effects, making implicit statements about body weight that can
stigmatize obese people.67
Third, the laws apply specifically to adolescents in schools, where

64. Janet L. Collins, Robert S. Gold, Laura Kann, Lloyd J. Kolbe, Beth Collins Patemen & Meg
Leavy Small, School Health Education, 65 J. SCH. HEALTH 302 (1995). The state policies do not
prescribe specific materials that a class must cover, nor do any require a separate, self-contained class
devoted solely to diet and nutrition, though individual districts and schools have discretion to devise
additional guidelines. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, SCHOOL HEALTH POLICIES
AND PROGRAMS STUDY, available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/shpps/1994/pdf/main.pdf
(reporting that 80% of districts require nutrition be taught, and 84% of schools include education on
dietary behaviors and nutrition in their curricula).
65. Id. at 309.
66. Studies have linked nutrition education with dietary behaviors and knowledge, physical
activity, attitudes, or physical health indicators such as BMI. See, e.g., Alicia Raby Powers, Barbara J.
Struempler, Anthony Guarino & Sondra M. Parmer, Effects of a Nutrition Education Program on the
Dietary Behaviors and Nutrition Knowledge of Second-Grade and Third-Grade Students, 75 J. SCH.
HEALTH 129 (2005); Carmen Pérez-Rodrigo & Javier Aranceta, School-Based Nutrition Education:
Lessons Learned and New Perspectives, 4 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 131, 136 (2001); Yannis Manios,
Joanna Moschandreas, Christos Hatzis & Anthony Kafatos, Evaluation of a Health and Nutrition
Education Program in Primary School Children of Crete over a Three-Year Period, 28 PREVENTATIVE
MED. 149 (1999); F. Angelico, M. Del Ben, L. Fabiani, P. Lentini, F. Pannozzo, G.C. Urbinati & G.
Ricci, Management of Childhood Obesity Through a School-Based Programme of General Health and
Nutrition Education, 105 PUB. HEALTH 393 (1991).
67. My own tabulations of student-level data merged with the state-level data on nutrition laws
show a strong positive correlation between states that require nutrition education and students reporting
that they learned about the health problems of obesity in school.
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social norms are prominent and networks in schools can be very
influential. As sociologist Robert Crosnoe argues, “[T]he valence and
intensity of cultural messages vary considerably across specific pockets
of this mass culture. As a bounded, identifiable setting of adolescent
life, the school is an appropriate unit for considering local contexts of
youth culture.”68 Furthermore, researchers have linked peer influence
and social norms to eating behaviors.69 Others have also documented
differences in perceived norms about healthy eating habits in some
nutrition education interventions, concluding that these programs
encourage young people’s acceptance of healthy food choices.70 Still,
whether or how actual norms about obesity (and the social acceptability
of obese persons themselves) shift in the wake of laws presents a ripe
empirical question and a highly relevant application in testing legal
theory.
How exactly could nutrition education laws have expressive effects?
First, consider the analogous example of sex education laws and their
controversy. A rationale for mandating sex education in public schools
is to lower the costs of safe sex by providing information. At the same
time, according to the information-updating model proposed by
McAdams, as well as Benabou and Tirole, the laws might communicate
that teen sex is (or should be) the norm, which critics worry would
encourage students to have more sex (protected or not), independently
of the effect of more information about contraceptives.71 Following this
information-updating framework, nutrition education laws would lower
the costs of achieving a healthy weight by providing information. At the
same time, the law itself communicates to students that being
overweight or obese should not be the norm, independently of its effect
in lowering the information costs of losing weight.
C. Summary of Predictions
To spell out the analytical framework more concisely, an anti-obesity
law should have direct incentive effects for obese or overweight persons
to lose weight. Healthier diets, more exercise, lower obesity rates, or
68. Crosnoe, supra note 8, at 244.
69. See, e.g., Marla E. Eisenberg et al., The Role of Social Norms and Friends’ Influences on
Unhealthy Weight-Control Behaviors Among Adolescent Girls, 60 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1165 (2005);
Patricia Pliner & Nikki Mann, Influence of Social Norms and Palatability on Amount Consumed and
Food Choice, 42 APPETITE 227 (2004); J.G. Maeland & L.E. Aaro, The Theoretical Basis for Health
Education in Medical Practice, 113 TIDSKRIFT FOR DEN NORSKE LAEGEFORENING 51 (1993).
70. See, e.g., Tom Baranowski et al., Gimme 5 Fruit, Juice, and Vegetables for Fun and Health:
Outcome Evaluation, 27 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 96, 96–97 (2000).
71. Indeed, Lessig notes that beyond conveying information, “education can alter social
meaning[].” Lessig, supra note 13, at 1022.
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lower average BMIs could serve as evidence of incentives at work in an
anti-obesity, nutrition education policy. A “pro-obesity” or “obesityfriendly” law should have the opposite incentives regarding weightrelated behaviors.
Obesity laws can have expressive functions that shift social norms
regarding obesity. This can be represented by an increase in the social
stigma of obese persons under anti-obesity law. Applying the beliefupdating model,72 an anti-obesity law such as a dietary education
mandate reveals information that the norm is a lower body weight than
what individuals previously believed it to be. On average, people then
update their beliefs and adjust their dietary or weight-related behaviors
to conform to the norm. People who remain obese, however, are now
even further away from the norm of lower body weight and experience
greater stigma.73
D. Mechanism: Personal Responsibility
Several mechanisms might explain how laws could shift norms
regarding obesity. The most obvious is that policymakers intentionally
make anti-obesity policy to generate social stigma against the obese as a
shaming device to discourage unhealthy behaviors. The billboards in
Georgia come to mind in proclaiming that obesity is undesirable. In this
way, social stigma is used as a direct deterrent, since it adds to the
psychic costs of being obese. But most policies, including nutrition
education requirements as well as the White House’s “Let’s Move”
campaign do not so blatantly vilify the population.
A second and more plausible mechanism specific to obesity is related
to a tacit (or not so tacit) emphasis on individual choices as a major
cause of obesity. While many factors can contribute to obesity, public
health communications cite individual behaviors leading to energy
imbalance—consuming too many calories while not expending enough
physical activity—as “the bottom line.”74 And with escalating health
care costs, obesity is commonly approached as an economic problem
where weight gain stems from individual choices.75 Strong popular
72. See McAdams, supra note 11; Benabou & Tirole, supra note 19.
73. A finding that anti-obesity laws do not decrease obesity rates would not dispel the validity of
the laws’ expressive effects. Diet and exercise behaviors may be more reasonable measures of antiobesity effort rather than changes in body weight. If laws express more focus on weight loss through
dietary effort, then weight norms could become lower despite no visible changes in obesity rates.
74. Defining Overweight and Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 8,
2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/causes/index.html; What are Overweight and Obesity?,
NAT’L
HEART
LUNG
AND
BLOOD
INST.
(Sept.
8,
2012,
5:59
PM),http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/obe/obe_causes.html.
75. Tomas Philipson & Richard Posner, Is the Obesity Epidemic a Public Health Problem? A
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sentiments attributing obesity to poor personal choices were especially
prominent amid the controversy over fast food class action litigation,
which charged fast food companies with inflicting obesity-related harms
in connection with people’s consumption of their products.76 The
“American Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act,” the
House’s response to the fast food litigation in 2004, barred lawsuits
against restaurants claiming that their food made people fat and
undeniably voiced the idea that people were overweight due to their own
choices.77 These attitudes are consistent with conclusions from some
researchers that “[s]ociety regularly regards obese persons not as
innocent victims, but as architects of their own ill health, personally
responsible for their weight problems because of laziness and
overeating.”78
In light of the sentiments above, anti-obesity policies could further
influence how society associates individual choices with obesity.
Promoting personal responsibility in managing body weight, then, is a
reasonable mechanism for a law’s expressive effects on obesity stigma.
Anti-obesity laws such as nutrition education mandates and soda taxes
target choices in diet and physical activity by directly incentivizing
healthier behaviors or deterring unhealthy ones. Recall the beliefupdating framework, which predicts that obesity stigma arises when (1)
the law expresses that the norm should be a lower body weight, (2)
Decade of Research on the Economics of Obesity (NBER, Working Paper No. 14010, 2008) (stating that
obesity is not only a public health issue but also an economic problem, where caloric intake and
expenditure are functions of individual choice).
76. For discussions comparing fast food obesity claims with tobacco litigation, see Richard A.
Daynard, Food Litigation: Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2179 (2002);
Joseph P. McMenamin & Andrea D. Tiglio, Not the Next Tobacco: Defenses to Obesity Claims, 61
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate
Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361 (2005); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A.
Brennan, Obesity—The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2601 (2006); Kelly
D. Brownell & Kenneth Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions
Died. How Similar Is Big Food?, 87 MILBANK Q. 259 (2009).
77. Chairman of the Judiciary Committee Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-WI) declared,
“This bill says, Don’t run off and file a lawsuit if you are fat . . . It says, Look in the mirror because
you’re the one to blame.” Carl Hulse, Vote in House Offers a Shield in Obesity Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2004, at A1.
78. Puhl & Heuer, supra note 40, at 1020. The following Internet post is an example of this
sentiment:
Even when most people are made aware of the health dangers of foods, they keep on
eating the garbage foods anyway! People must certainly know that ice cream and soft
drinks promote obesity, and yet you see it time and time again at the supermarket: loads
of ice cream tubs and 12-packs of soft drinks in the shopping carts of 300-pound people
who can barely squeeze into the checkout lanes. Clearly, this is a personal responsibility
problem: these people need to stop making excuses and start making better choices about
foods and groceries.
Mike Adams, Is Obesity a Choice or a Disease?, NATURALNEWS.COM, July 19, 2004,
http://www.naturalnews.com/001416.html.
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people update their beliefs and behaviors to adjust to the lower weight
norm, and (3) people who remain obese experience more stigma as they
are now further from the norm. Under a policy expressing that the norm
should be a lower weight via making healthier and more responsible
choices, obese persons become negatively perceived as lazier, or
exerting less effort in maintaining a lower weight than their non-obese
peers. Thus, society accepts or stigmatizes a person based on weight, at
least partly because anti-obesity law implies that heavier weight is due
to the person’s own bad choices.
A very basic separating equilibrium model with information
asymmetry can illustrate views about personal responsibility in obesity
stigma.79 Because of obesity laws (i.e., dietary behaviors and nutrition
education policy), society values people who follow the lower weight
norms as making more responsible choices. In this simplified model,
people who are closer to the low weight norm will minimize their
stigma. Becoming thinner; however, requires a costlier investment of
effort in diet, exercise, and time. Here, there are two types of people:
“Type I” and “Type II.”
For various genetic, economic, or
environmental reasons, the costs of losing weight are lower for Type I
and higher for Type II.
Figure 1 depicts the cost curves for Type I and Type II, as well as the
payoffs that they would receive in society from minimizing stigma given
the effort they invest in losing weight. Type II faces cost curve cII,
which is steeper than the cost curve cI of Type I. The equilibrium effort,
y*, is the social norm’s amount of health effort that is more likely to
translate into some visible weight loss for Type I than for Type II. For
both, when society observes effort y < y*, the gross benefit of avoiding
stigma is w2.

79. This framework adapts Nobel economist Michael Spence’s groundbreaking signaling model,
which characterizes education as a costly credential that only high ability workers will invest in, to
convey information to employers that they are intrinsically more productive than low ability workers.
See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973).
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When society ob
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o w2. For T
Type I, the beenefits outweeigh
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ng effort y*,, so that exeerting y* woould yield a net
payoff of w1–cI(y*)), which is greater
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than w 2. Therefore, it is ratioonal
for Typ
pe I to choosse to invest effort in losiing weight (y = y*) and for
Type III to choose not
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I’s who
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8
health.80
This model of effort
e
is nott the only m
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m anti-obesityy laws.81 In vview of popuular
obesity stigma migh
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effect on improving
i
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81. An alternate explanation is that th
he law would direectly reduce obesiity rates, and the mere
salience off the fewer obese persons remainin
ng would increase their stigmatizati on. Cf. Patricia F
Funk,
Governmental Action, Socia
al Norms and Crim
minal Behavior, 1661 J. INST’L & TH
HEORETICAL ECON
N. 522
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prejudices against obese persons, I propose this as a plausible model for
policies that express messages about body weight norms while targeting
individual choices.
E. Heterogeneity of Expressive Effects: Pre-Existing Social Norms
The expressive effects of laws can vary depending on pre-existing
norms, whether determined by culture, genetics, or other factors. To
illustrate this, consider again the simple model from before. Here, I
show examples of how the initial distribution of Type I’s and Type II’s
(whose costs differ due to genetics, culture, and socioeconomic
circumstances) can make a difference in the stigma effects of the law. I
argue that being saliently obese, or being one of the few obese persons
among most people who are not obese, worsens stigma. Meanwhile,
being relatively less obese, or being obese among many others who are
also obese, lessens stigma.
Consider a society with more Type I’s than Type II’s. An antiobesity law directly changes the incentives or costs of losing weight.
Because the majority of people are Type I, they will internalize the costs
and lose weight, resulting in a lower weight norm. With fewer Type
II’s, it becomes easier to spot the remaining obese persons and attribute
their status to poor personal choices. Here, the law has shifted the
weight norm downward, so to remain obese is more salient amid a
population that is generally thinner. Due to the law’s expressive effects,
obese persons experience more stigma because they are further from the
norm.
But now consider a society with many more Type II’s than Type I’s.
Since it is far costlier for Type II’s to lose weight (due to genetics,
economic circumstance, etc.), many more people in this society will
remain obese despite an anti-obesity law. Hence, it appears that the law
does not shift the weight norms as much. As a result, being obese would
be less stigmatizing because obese persons are closer to the heavier
weight norm than if the law had shifted the norm to a lower body
weight.
In concluding this Part, by providing an additional means to separate
the population based on traits that were previously unobservable, a law
that gives more benefits to potentially thinner people than heavier
people would induce a further separation among the population and
associations of perceptions of their unobserved qualities (such as
“laziness”) based on weight. Those persons who remain obese are
(2005). This explanation is consistent with the model that I have described, which posits that those
fewer persons who remain obese after a law is enacted might experience worse stigma because they are
viewed as exerting less effort.
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viewed as “lazy,” which worsens their stigma. In this way, the law
expresses the value that obese persons should be less worthy.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This Part empirically analyzes the relationship between norms and
obesity-related laws, using state dietary behaviors and nutrition
education requirements as anti-obesity law. The inquiry focuses on
adolescent female students attending schools across the United States in
the mid-1990s. I note that social networks are especially influential
among this age and gender group,82 and deviating from weight norms
can have more acute effects on adolescent girls. I use the National
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, whose data on high school
friendship networks and self-reported feelings of social acceptance are
good for measuring social stigma, and whose data on educational
outcomes allow me to assess how obesity stigma matters to economic
well-being in the long run. Using this data, I estimate differences in
stigma and educational outcomes experienced by obese versus nonobese female students corresponding to the obesity-related laws.
The main purpose of this analysis is to produce empirical estimates
that can confirm or challenge the social norm hypotheses of expressive
law and economics. The basic empirical strategy relies on crosssectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate
differences in individual outcomes across states with varying obesity
laws. To minimize biases from variables that can correspond to
location, school, or family background, the regressions control for
demographic, school-level, and neighborhood characteristics. This
regression is a standard technique used in empirical law and social
sciences.83 In implementing this, my analysis offers original evidence
that links stricter anti-obesity laws with more obesity stigma.
In developing the empirics, I also consider the “personal
responsibility” mechanism to explain obesity stigma that follows from
anti-obesity laws. I find that dietary education laws correspond with
some increased health efforts and little to no decrease in obesity. These
patterns are consistent with anti-obesity laws that emphasize healthy
personal choices, highlighting the role of “personal responsibility” in
one’s weight. Furthermore, higher cigarette taxes correspond with
higher rates of obesity in general, suggesting that cigarette taxes might
be interpreted as a de facto “obesity-friendly” law. Finally, to
understand whether or how obesity laws shift norms, I consider pre82. See Peggy C. Giordano, Relationships in Adolescence, 29 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 257 (2003).
83. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 861 (3d ed. 2006).
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existing norms and find that the law’s expressive effects vary by peer
groups with different underlying norms.
Some caveats should be noted when interpreting the results. First, the
goal of the analysis is to determine whether a relationship between
obesity-related laws and obesity stigma exists as predicted by theory.
As such, the reader’s focus should be on signs and statistical
significance; the magnitudes of stigma or exactly how much norms shift
are not the main concern of this study. Second, the estimates from the
basic cross-sectional regression model are merely suggestive of the
social norm influences of obesity laws. A true experiment in varying
laws across identical groups of people would be preferred in establishing
causation. As is typical in many empirical studies, short of conducting a
randomized controlled experiment, regression estimates can be
susceptible to biases from reverse causality or omitted variables. With
obesity laws, reverse causality (endogeneity) should not be a problem
under the common assumption that state-varying laws are enacted
exogenously, and therefore, provide a “natural experiment” for
evaluating the effects of policy on individual behaviors.84 While the
assumption that laws are exogenous is controversial,85 it is highly
plausible that reverse causality is not an issue here—current social
stigma outcomes of obese youth are not motivating past changes in state
anti-obesity policies during this time period. However, omitted variable
bias, or failing to account for unobserved characteristics or underlying
time trends, can make it more difficult to infer causality from crosssectional models.86 I employ some techniques and robustness checks to
address this, which I describe in the next subparts.

84. It is reasonable that obesity stigma is unlikely to be directly motivating policymakers to enact
dietary education laws, and even less likely to be motivating changes in state cigarette tax rates. State
variation in laws is generally accepted among empirical law and economics scholars as a sufficient
“natural experiment” for identifying causal effects on people’s behaviors. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick &
Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407, 411 (2003) (observing that state variation in “[a]bortion
legalization provides a natural quasi experiment to determine the effect of abortion availability on STD
incidence”); Jonathan Gruber & Michael Frakes, Does Falling Smoking Lead to Rising Obesity?, 25 J.
HEALTH ECON. 183 (2006).
85. It is important to point out that assumptions that state laws vary exogenously may be
inaccurate. Through the political process, people lobby for policy changes to satisfy their preferences,
such that an economic or social trend may instead be driving a change in the law. See, e.g., Timothy
Besley & Anne Case, Unnatural experiments? Estimating the incidence of endogenous policies, 110
ECON. J. F672 (2000). Thus, an increasing trend in crime may inspire policymakers to enact laws with
tougher criminal sanctions. Indeed, preexisting norms can predict legal precedent and can therefore
determine how states may regulate in areas such as obscenity or property law. See Daniel L. Chen &
Susan Yeh, Distinguishing Between Custom and Law: Empirical Examples in Property and First
Amendment Precedents, 21 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. (forthcoming 2013).
86. See, e.g., WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 83, at 13–14.
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A. Data
1. The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
This analysis uses the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
Health (Add Health), a nationally representative survey that asks
detailed questions on health, peer networks, and education.87 Clustered
sampling occurred first at the school level, in which 80 high schools and
their 54 feeder middle schools were selected following a stratified
sampling scheme designed to be representative of U.S. schools
according to region, urbanicity, school type, size, and ethnicity. The
schools range in size from twenty-five to 2,559 students. In 1994–1995,
all students in these schools received an in-school questionnaire, which
asked basic questions about their race, parental education, and other
demographic traits. Next, under a scheme of stratified sampling by race,
age, and sex within each school, seventeen female and seventeen male
students per grade per school were randomly selected for the
longitudinal study, which consist of very detailed in-home and parental
interviews. In 16 schools, all enrolled students were followed
longitudinally as part of Add Health’s “saturated sample.” Respondents
were enrolled in grades 7–12 at the first longitudinal survey in 1994–
1995 (Wave 1). Follow-ups occurred in 1996 (Wave 2), and 2001–2002
(Wave 3).
In addition to standard data on demographic and
socioeconomic background, these longitudinal surveys include sensitive
data on friendship networks, health outcomes, and school transcript
grades, among others. About 15,000 sample individuals were followed
from Wave 1 through Wave 3. Of these, about 3,700 students are in
Add Health’s saturated sample, which spans 16 representative states.
The variables for my analysis are drawn from the In-Home
interviews, since both obesity and stigma variables are available only in
this component of Add Health. To measure obesity, I create an obesity
indicator variable using the Centers for Disease Control’s definitions,
which relies on computing a BMI from height and weight.88 To measure
87. The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER:
ADD HEALTH (Sept. 8, 2012 7:06 PM), http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth (machine-readable
data file and documentation). Add Health is a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and
designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal
agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for
assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on
the Add Health website. Id. No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
88. Doctors routinely screen for obesity by measuring one’s body mass index (BMI), which is
the ratio of weight in kilograms to squared height in meters. Individuals over age 20 are classified as
obese (BMI ≥ 30), overweight (30 > BMI ≥ 25), normal (25 > BMI ≥ 18.5) and underweight (BMI <
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social stigma, I use friendship network data and self-reported social
acceptance.89 In the friendship network data, I focus on three different
variables: (1) the number of students whom the respondent names as a
friend (out-degree friends); (2) the number of students who name the
respondent as their friend (in-degree friends); and (3) an index of
popularity that is commonly used in social network analysis (proximity
prestige).90 Additionally, I create socioeconomic controls for family
income, parent’s marital status, and parental education from the parental
In-Home interview in Wave 1.91
Because my analysis considers pre-existing norms or peer effects, I
need to create cohort-level variables based on characteristics of students
in each grade at the sample schools, to control for otherwise unobserved
18.5)).
CENTER
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_bmi/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
Because BMI and body fat increase dramatically with age among youth, I follow the Centers for Disease
Control’s procedure of using age–sex growth charts of a reference population in the 1970s to compute
BMI percentiles for youth ages 7 to 20. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr025.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
Using these BMI
percentiles, the CDC defines youth individuals as “obese” (BMI percentile ≥ 95), “overweight” (95 >
BMI percentile ≥ 85), “healthy weight” (85 > BMI percentile ≥ 5), or “underweight” (BMI percentile <
5). I use the obese indicator in my main specifications. I also check specifications that use the
continuous BMI variable.
89. I re-code “social acceptance” as a variable with values ranging from 1 to 5, where 1
corresponds to feeling the least socially accepted, and 5 corresponds with feeling most socially accepted.
In the In-Home survey, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the statement, “You feel
socially accepted,” with 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = disagree; 5 =
strongly disagree. I flip the original variable’s coding.
90. “Prestige” identifies important actors within a social network, meaning that the actor is
named by many others as a friend (popular), but she initiates few relations herself. “Proximity” refers to
how closely other people in the network can reach the actor directly and indirectly. “Proximity
prestige” measures the prestige of the actor relative to the number of people who can reach her:

prxprest i 

Ii
(g 1)
d(n j,n i )


j

Ii

where Ii = influence domain of i, which is equal to the number of other people who can reach i;
g = number of nodes in X;
d(nj, ni) = distance between actor j to actor i.
91. Parental education is constructed as the higher of the mother’s or father’s years of education.
In the parental interview module, an interviewer administered a written questionnaire to the youth’s
mother or other parent/guardian if the mother was unavailable. I impute missing values using those
available for another youth in the same family, replace the remaining missing values with the mean
values by the birth years of the sample adolescents, and flag the imputed observations with indicators;
flagged observations range from 14.8 percent (married indicator) to 25.7 percent (family income) of the
youth in the original survey. Missing values for race and academic outcomes were not imputed.
Estimates are robust whether simply omitting the observations with missing values from the analysis or
including them with imputed values and flags.
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differences across peer groups. For the cohort-level measures in my
main specifications, I rely on Add Health’s saturated sample, where
obesity measures (among others) are available for all students in the
schools.92 Most of the social norm outcome variables are available in
Wave 1, but educational attainment is measured in Wave 3.93 To
maintain a consistent analysis sample, I restrict the analysis to saturated
sample observations with non-missing values for BMI, non-missing
race, and non-missing longitudinal sample weights for analysis across
waves of the survey.
2. Obesity Laws
I use the state-level dietary behaviors and nutrition education
requirements as a measure for anti-obesity law. These state policy
variables come from the 1994 School Health Policies and Programs
Study.94 The state law variable is coded as an indicator for whether the
state requires its schools to offer “dietary behaviors and nutrition
education.” Appendix Table 1 shows that thirty-one states had these
requirements; of the sixteen states represented in my analysis sample,
ten states had these requirements. Parts of the analysis use state
cigarette taxes to check for the robustness of the main results. State
excise taxes on cigarettes per pack (in cents) as of 1995 come from the
CDC State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE)
System. State cigarette tax rates range from 3 cents to 56 cents in the
analysis sample.
3. Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the analysis sample of
female respondents in Add Health. The main analysis sample includes

92. Obesity variables are not available in the in-school survey given to all students in the 134
schools. To include more schools, constructing cohort-level measures using the non-saturated
longitudinal sample is an alternative, but these would be based on small samples within the school and
are susceptible to measurement error and attenuation bias. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS 84–86 (5th ed. 2003). I also check my regressions using the non-saturated sample but get
very noisy estimates, as expected.
93. The years of education variable was constructed from responses to a Wave 3 question that
asked for the “highest grade or year of regular school” completed. I re-code years of education to
account for type of degree earned and/or institution attended using the typical value for years of
education corresponding to the highest degree earned as recommended by Park (1996). This re-coding
affects 13 percent of the sample. See generally Jin Heum Park, Measuring Education Over Time: A
Comparison of Old and New Measures of Educ[a]tion from the Current Population Survey, 50 ECON.
LETTERS 425 (1996).
94. See Michael T. Errecart et al., Methodology, 65 J. SCH. HEALTH 295 (1995).
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1,131 observations from sixteen schools.95 Of the female students, 9.9%
were obese, 15.7% were overweight, 69.9% were normal weight, and
4.5% were underweight according to Wave 1 (1994–1995) measures of
height and weight.96 School sizes range from thirty to 1,744. The
average student attended a school with 532 students. Of the sample,
75% attended a school in an urban area, and 24.5% attended a private
school. Nationally representative longitudinal probability weights and
corrections for clustered sampling by school and stratification by region
were applied to all estimates.
B. Econometric Model
To start, consider equation (1), the basic econometric model:
(1) yijs = 1Laws*Obeseijs +2Laws +3Obeseijs +4Xijs +ijs
where the subscripts denote individual i, school j, and state s. Here,
yijs is the outcome variable for social stigma or educational attainment.
Laws is the state obesity law variable, i.e., dietary behaviors and
nutrition requirements. Obeseijs is a dummy variable indicating whether
the individual is obese. Xijs is a vector of individual demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics, including the student’s race, age, family
income, parental education, parent’s marital status.
The main
coefficient of interest is on the interaction term Laws*Obeseijs, which
captures the differential stigma effect that the law has on obese students,
after controlling for the general shift in social norms among all students
due to the law (using Laws) and the stigma that obese students already
feel without the law (using Obeseijs). This model is a cross-sectional
OLS regression that controls for a number of individual, family, and
school characteristics that could otherwise bias estimates of the law’s
role in shifting social norms.97
95. The longitudinal sample, which I use in a robustness check but lacks the variables for social
network analysis, includes 10,227 observations from 132 schools.
96. The youth obesity prevalence in this sample is somewhat lower than the commonly cited
statistics and trends based on national data from the Centers for Disease Control. See Cynthia L. Ogden,
Katherine M. Flegal, Margaret D. Carroll & Clifford L. Johnson, Prevalence and Trends in Overweight
among U.S. Children and Adolescents, 1999-2000, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1728 (2002) (reporting
obesity prevalence rates based on the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey).
97. Despite this, I acknowledge that the OLS model can be susceptible to omitted variable biases
that can understate or overstate a law’s effect. Unobserved background traits of individuals may be
correlated with whether or not they experience a particular law. For example, families that are very
health conscious and disdainful of body fat might prefer to live in states with more stringent dietary
education requirements. A greater concentration of families with lower weight norms could be a major
explanation for observing greater obesity stigma in states with anti-obesity laws. Failing to account for
such family traits can lead a researcher to over- or under-attribute stigma or other outcomes to the law.
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A model of how laws shift social norms should consider pre-existing
norms. Thus, the next step is to test for whether the law’s expressive
effects on obesity stigma vary by different underlying norms. However,
a challenge is that students and their families might tend to self-select
their peers and underlying norms, which could bias any estimates of
peer effects. To alleviate this bias, I adapt the cohort-differences model
that labor economists have previously implemented using Add Health to
estimate peer effects on academic outcomes.98 This technique uses
variation in pre-existing peer norms based on how many students of a
particular culture (e.g., white students or obese students) randomly
appear above or below their expected numbers in a particular grade in a
school. In other words, this method maintains that while students’
characteristics may determine where they live or which schools they
attend, exactly how many white (or obese) students are present across
different grades within the same school is exogenous.99
To adapt this method,100 I observe that weight norms differ by peer
groups—having more white students in one’s grade within the school
worsens stigma, while having more obese students lessens it—and I use
the variation across cohorts’ demographic composition to assess how
stigma from the law varies by different pre-existing norms. In defining
underlying norms, I use white peers as one proxy for culture, based on
published findings that weight standards may differ between whites and
racial minorities.101 I use obese peers as another proxy for culture
because the number of one’s peers who are obese may signal a higher
pre-existing weight norm, as I explained in Part IV.102 Being obese
A common solution is to use panel data, or data from the same individuals collected at multiple periods
over time, and then control for individual fixed effects, or all time-invariant unobserved characteristics
that are specific to an individual. Then one would infer that changes in outcomes are due to changes in
the laws over the years. I try implementing this individual fixed effects model, but there is not enough
power for estimation in Add Health, because the state obesity laws change for only a handful of the
individuals during the survey years. Also for this reason, I do not implement the differences-indifferences estimator to evaluate the effects of laws that vary across states and over time, which is
another standard technique in empirical law and economics.
98. See Robert Bifulco, Jason M. Fletcher, & Stephen L. Ross, The Effect of Classmate
Characteristics on Post-Secondary Outcomes: Evidence from the Add Health, 3 AM. ECON. J: ECON.
POL’Y 25 (2011); see also Victor Lavy, M. Daniele Paserman & Analia Schlosser, Inside the Black Box
of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in the Proportion of Low Achievers in the Classroom
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14415, 2008); Caroline Hoxby, Peer Effects in the
Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7867, 2000).
99. Bifulco et al., supra note 98.
100. I do not control for the within-school fixed effects exactly according to the Hoxby or Bifulco
et al. method (which focus on peer effects and not law effects). Doing so in my case would cause
collinearity problems with the state law variables.
101. See, e.g., Latner et al., supra note 56; Christian S. Crandall, Prejudice Against Fat People:
Ideology and Self-Interest, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 882 (1994).
102. Cf. Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social
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while surrounded by more peers who are obese may lessen stigma that
may arise from being saliently heavier than others.
Equation (2) is the main specification in estimating whether obesity
laws influence obesity stigma, taking into account pre-existing norms:
(2) yijs = 1Laws*Obeseicjs*PeerNormcjs + 2Laws*Obeseicjs
+ 3Obeseicjs*PeerNormcjs + 4Laws*PeerNormcjs
+ 5Laws + 6Obeseicjs + 7PeerNormcjs
+ 8Xicjs + 9Schoolj + 10Cohortc + ijs
where PeerNormcjs is the vector of variables denoting the percentage
of students in cohort c at school j who are white or who are obese, and
Schoolj is a vector of school characteristics including school size, public
or private status, urbanicity, and region. The coefficient 3 on the
interaction between Obeseicjs and PeerNormcjs measures how obese
students fare as the percentage of white peers (or obese peers) increases;
I define this the pre-existing obesity norm. The main coefficient of
interest is 1 on Laws*Obeseicjs*PeerNormcjs, which reveals how the
law’s influence on obesity stigma varies by pre-existing obesity norms
as defined by peer groups.
C. Results
Tables 2 through 8 display the results of my regression analyses. The
primary goal is to empirically establish whether or not a relationship
exists between obesity laws and obesity norms that would be consistent
with predictions of expressive law and economic theories. As such, the
signs and statistical significance of the estimates are the focal points in
these tables.
1. Main Estimates of the Relationship Between Laws and Stigma
Table 2 shows the relationship between state dietary behaviors and
nutrition education laws and obesity stigma, applying OLS estimation to
equation (1). In this table, an indicator for whether the respondent is
obese during the first wave of the survey (1994–1995) serves as the
obesity measure. Each column shows results for one of four different
outcome variables that can proxy for social stigma: self-reported
feelings of social acceptance in school; number of students naming the
respondent as their friend, number of students the respondent names as
her friend, and proximity prestige, all of which proxy for one’s status
Network Over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (2007) (finding that being surrounded by obese
peers corresponds to higher obesity probabilities).
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within the school’s social network. First, note that holding all other
variables equal, obese girls have fewer friends than non-obese girls, with
2.969 fewer schoolmates naming an obese respondent as their friend
(column 2), where the mean respondent in the sample has 5.647 friends
(see Table 1). An obese adolescent girl having fewer friends would be
consistent with the negative social perceptions of obese persons in the
United States, as documented by Puhl and Heuer (2009).103 Interpreting
the coefficient on the Obese indicator variable, in states with no dietary
education requirements, the social acceptance of obese girls does not
statistically differ from that of non-obese girls.
The expressive influence of anti-obesity law on obesity stigma
corresponds to the coefficient on the interaction term between the
dietary education law variable and the obesity indicator. The -0.467
coefficient on the interaction, which is statistically significant at the 5%
level, means that in states with dietary education requirements, obese
girls are less socially accepted than non-obese girls. In other words, the
level of social stigma (in terms of social acceptance) from obesity is
worse under an anti-obesity law. There is no statistically significant
difference in the number of friends or proximity prestige.
The results in Table 2 support theories that obesity-related laws could
shift obesity norms on average (not taking into account pre-existing
norms). I acknowledge that although the specifications attempt to
control for individual, family, and school characteristics, the coefficients
may still be over or underestimated due to omitted variable biases. For
example, there may be unobservable factors that drive obese students
with social outlier personalities to begin with to sort into states with
dietary education requirements, lower cigarette tax rates, or both. In this
example, not controlling for the unobserved factors may lead me to
over-attribute stigma effects to obesity law.
2. Robustness Checks
Table 3 examines how the estimated relationship between obesity
laws and obesity stigma changes when removing and adding a variety of
controls, or measuring body weight with BMI instead of an obesity
indicator. This exercise can be informative of the results’ sensitivity to
omitted variable bias. Column 1 shows the estimates of the influence of
dietary behaviors and nutrition education laws when excluding schoollevel characteristics and cohort dummies. In column 2, these controls
are added back and the estimates here are identical to the first coefficient
in column 1 of Table 2. The estimates for the laws are robust whether
103. See generally Puhl & Heuer, supra note 3.
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including or removing school characteristics, which are plausibly
correlated with individual preferences for location or school type. I also
compare results using BMI instead of an obese indicator variable.
Dietary education laws continue to have stronger, negative impacts on
weight stigma (column 5 of Table 3).
Column 3 of Table 3 shows how sensitive the estimates are when
including both the dietary education laws and the cigarette tax rates in
the regression. There are two reasons for checking this. First, if the
omitted variables correlated with dietary education laws are also
correlated with state-specific health policy climates as reflected in
cigarette taxes, including cigarette taxes would help minimize bias on
the estimates for dietary education laws. Second, dietary education
requirements as anti-obesity law and cigarette taxes as obesity-related
laws104 may have some competing effects on obesity norms. It can be
cleaner to estimate the effect of an anti-obesity law, holding the
relatively obesity-friendly cigarette tax constant. When including both
laws, dietary education laws continue to worsen obesity stigma; the
coefficient of -0.533 is similar and slightly larger in magnitude than if
tax rates were excluded.
A policy goal of anti-obesity laws is to directly reduce obesity rates.
If nutrition education laws reduce the number of obese people, then the
fewer students who remain obese become more salient, as they are now
heavier relative to their peers. Thus, changes in the number of people
engaging in a behavior discouraged by the law may increase stigma for
people who persist in that behavior.105 Still, Column 4 of Table 3
verifies that the main findings of obesity stigma are robust when
including a control for the percentage of students who are obese per
school.
3. Robustness Checks Using an Obesity-Friendly Policy
To further establish that obesity stigma outcomes arise from antiobesity expressions of anti-obesity law, I compare results using state
cigarette tax rates.106 It is possible that the mere fact that an obesityrelated law was enacted will be linked to behaviors in a particular
direction, regardless of which side the law favors.107 Analyzing a health
104. See infra Part IV(C)(3).
105. Cf. Funk, supra note 81.
106. Appendix Table 9 lists state cigarette excise tax rates as of 1995.
107. See, e.g., Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, Growth Under the Shadow of Expropriation? The
Economic Impacts of Eminent Domain 50 (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.duke.edu/~dlc28/papers/EminentDomain.pdf at 50 (finding that regardless of the case’s
resolution, the appearance of an appellate regulatory takings case leads to higher property values in the
locality of the original regulation in the long run, and the reason may be due to [u]nobserved factors that
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law that is a placebo or that has tacitly obesity-friendly incentives can
help verify that stigma outcomes arise from the anti-obesity values
expressed by nutrition education laws rather than from the mere
presence of having any law with incentives related to body weight.108
Cigarette taxes are useful, as they represent health-related consumption
laws that are not immediately associated with raising obesity awareness
but, as discussed below, have been linked with obesity rates.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 show that higher cigarette tax rates are
correlated with a higher likelihood of being obese. This result aligns
with existing studies. On the margin, higher cigarette tax rates can
increase the costs of losing weight (or maintaining a lower weight) by
smoking.109 Popular belief holds that smoking can help one lose weight
and that quitting smoking would lead to weight gain; these views follow
from findings that smoking increases metabolism and suppresses
appetite.110 Further, the link between cigarette policy and obesity has
been of interest to health economists, with studies finding evidence that
higher cigarette taxes (or higher cigarette prices) lead to higher obesity
rates.111 In theory then, the higher costs that consumers must pay to
purchase cigarettes can be a deterrent to losing weight or maintaining a
lower weight via smoking, so that state cigarette excise taxes might even
be considered to be a rough proxy for “obesity-friendly” laws in their
correlate with the land being worth litigating over).
108. Cf. id. See also Chen, Levonyan, & Yeh, supra note 15, at 16 (estimating the effects of prochoice appellate decisions on political preferences and estimating the effects of pro-life or conservative
decisions as a robustness check).
109. According to the 1986 Adult Use Tobacco Survey, 27% of smokers who had tried to quit
“reported that ‘actual weight gain’ was a ‘very important’ or ‘somewhat important’ reason why they
resumed smoking” and “[f]orty-seven percent of current smokers and 48 percent of former smokers
agreed with the statement that ‘smoking helps control weight.’” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL ix
(1990), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBCV.pdf.
110. Indeed, in 1990 the U.S. Surgeon General concluded from a review of fifteen studies that that
“four-fifths of smokers who quit gained weight after cessation,” and the people who quit smoking
gained about 4 pounds more on average than non-quitters. Id. at ix. The quitters’ increased weight
persists for up to 6 years or more before decreasing to the weight level of those people who never
smoked before. Paul. Froom et al., Smoking Cessation and Body Mass Index of Occupationally Active
Men: The Israeli CORDIS Study, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 718, 720–21 (1999); Tetsuya Mizouea et al.,
Body Mass Decrease After Initial Gain Following Smoking Cessation, 27 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 984
(1998).
111. See Shin-Yi Chou, Michael Grossman, & Henry Saffer, An Economic Analysis of Adult
Obesity: Results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 23 J. HEALTH. ECON. 565, 568–
69 (2004); Inas Rashad & Michael Grossman, The Economics of Obesity, 156 PUB. INTEREST 104, 108–
09 (2004); Charles L. Baum, The Effects of Cigarette Costs on BMI and Obesity, 18 HEALTH ECON. 3
(2009). But see Gruber & Frakes, supra note 84, at 183 (finding a negative relationship between
cigarette taxes and body weight); Charles Courtemanche, Rising Cigarette Prices and Rising Obesity:
Coincidence or Unintended Consequence?, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 781 (2009) (arguing that over time,
higher cigarette prices corresponds with lower BMI, which is partly due to effects on exercise and food
consumption).
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deterrent roles. Observing higher obesity rates amid higher tax rates
would be consistent with the tax’s deterrent effect on weight loss.112
It is reasonable to predict that a law that makes it costlier to lose
weight would either have no effect on or lessen the stigma of obese
persons. On the margin, weakly “obesity-friendly” tax rates should
leave weight norms unchanged if being overweight were already the
norm or should shift weight norms towards being heavier.113 Table 4 is
similar to Table 2 and shows the relationship between state cigarette tax
rates and weight stigma, using BMI to measure body weight.114 The
takeaway here is that obesity-friendly taxes weakly correspond with
heavier weight norms, which supports the idea that obesity stigma
outcomes arise from anti-obesity expressions of anti-obesity law rather
than from the mere presence of any health-related consumption law.
Higher cigarette taxes correspond with a marginally greater social
acceptance of girls who have higher BMIs, compared to their social
acceptance amid lower cigarette tax rates. In column 1 of Table 4, the
coefficient on the interaction of cigarette tax rates and BMI is positive
though weakly significant at the 10% level. Amid higher tax rates, each
unit of increase in BMI corresponds with an improvement in social
acceptance (by 0.000582 points) over the baseline penalty (of -0.0258)
in social acceptance that the same person would experience amid lower
tax rates.
This weak decrease in obesity stigma contrasts with the greater
obesity stigma under dietary behaviors and nutrition education policy.
That an increase in tax rates corresponds to little or no reduction in
weight stigma is consistent with the predictions that anti-obesity law
shift weight norms downward, while a law with some obesity-friendly
price incentives but no obvious announcement about body weight
should not.
112. It would also be consistent with increases in efforts to quit smoking or decreases in smoking,
all of which have been linked to weight gain (or at least not weight loss).
113. It is plausible that higher cigarette taxes, which discourage smoking by making it more
expensive, could also affirm heavier weight norms. The confluence of popular perceptions, advertising,
and research linking smoking with weight, as well as simply increasing the cost of a weight loss method,
suggest that cigarette taxes could express a normative statement about the body weight, even though it
may not intentionally speak about obesity as do dietary education mandates or a “fat” tax. Here, the
popular perception that smoking helps one lose weight or stay thin could be at work. Note also that
tobacco companies have a long history of advertising cigarettes with sleek imagery and associating
smoking with slender figures. See, e.g., F. Senaida Fernandez et al., Cigarette Advertising in Magazines
For Latinas, White Women, and Men, 1998–2002: A Preliminary Investigation, 30 J. COMMUNITY
HEALTH 141, 141–42 (2005); Alyssa N. Zucker et al., Smoking in College Women: The Role of Thinness
Pressures, Media Exposure, and Critical Consciousness, 25 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN QUARTERLY 233,
234–35 (2001).
114. Here, instead of an obesity indicator variable, I use BMI as a measure for body weight,
because cigarette taxes are indirect obesity-friendly laws that may affect behaviors at a different margin
than laws that explicitly address body weight.
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4. Direct Incentives and Health Effort
Recall that the incentive effects of dietary behaviors and nutrition
education requirements predict that more people would adopt healthier
habits and obesity rates would decline if people previously were at
unhealthy weights. Table 5 sheds light on the incentive effect by
showing estimates for the relationship between obesity laws and health
effort. Columns 1 and 3 show that students in states with dietary
behaviors and nutrition education requirements eat breakfast more
frequently, an average of 2 more days than students in states without the
requirements. However, the policy has no statistically significant
correlation with the students’ physical fitness (columns 4 and 6). Table
6 shows linear probability estimates of the relationship between the
policies and the likelihood of being obese.
Dietary education
requirements and higher cigarette taxes correspond with a higher
likelihood of obesity in 1994–1995, but the relationship weakens in
1996. Columns 2 and 4 show that higher cigarette tax rates correspond
to higher obesity probability, which supports the predicted incentive
effects of obesity-friendly policies and is also consistent with published
findings by Chou, Grossman, and Saffer (2004) and Baum (2009).115
However, the results for dietary education policies do not support
policymakers’ intentions that the anti-obesity law would incentivize a
decrease in obesity.
The effort model where obesity is perceived as a signal of bad
individual choices does not require obesity rates to change. The
increased frequency of eating breakfast reflects greater efforts to
improve one’s health (though additional calories from breakfast do not
necessarily result in weight loss). Therefore, under dietary education
policies, health effort increases and obesity rates are unchanged, but
social stigma worsens for obese girls. This pattern of results is still
consistent with the predictions of the personal responsibility mechanism
in obesity stigma, where the anti-obesity law promotes making better
choices in health effort, but in doing so encourages society to further
stigmatize obese people who are seen as making bad choices.
5. Heterogeneity and Pre-Existing Social Norms
I next analyze how obesity stigma arising from laws would vary by
pre-existing social norms, or the composition of one’s peers. Here, I
address the hypothesis that the composition of one’s peer group can
affect how much a law may increase one’s stigmatization. Suppose the

115. Chou et al., supra note 111; Baum, supra note 111.
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law shifts the weight norm downward. Amid a population that is
generally thinner, being obese becomes a more salient feature. As a
result of the law’s expressive effects, obese persons in a group of thinner
peers may experience more stigma because the law causes them to
appear even further away from the norm.
To address the role of one’s peers in the data, I apply equation (2) and
show coefficients on anti-obesity law, obesity, and cohort (peer)
composition variables in Table 7. The main coefficients of interest in
Tables 7 are on the three-way interactions of the law, obesity measure,
and the cohort composition variables. But first, observe that the other
displayed coefficients are themselves informative of the expressive
theory. In Table 7, the coefficients on Law*Obese reveal that under that
anti-obesity law, obese girls have fewer friends in school (columns 2–3).
To control for the pre-existing norms in the regressions, I include both
the percentage of a cohort that is white and the percentage that is obese
within each school (%White and %Obese, respectively). The coefficient
on Obese*%White is negative and statistically significant for the number
of friends and proximity prestige (columns 2–4 of Table 7). In other
words, at the baseline, obese girls experience more social stigma as the
percentage of their classmates who are white increases. This pattern is
consistent with anecdotal and published assertions that pressures to be
thin are greater among white people, compared to other races.116 In
contrast, the coefficient on Obese*%Obese is positive for the number of
friends and proximity prestige, meaning that at the baseline, obese girls
experience less social stigma as they are surrounded by more obese
classmates.
I find that obesity stigma arising from dietary behaviors and nutrition
education policies lessens as obese peers increase. To interpret the
coefficients, for every percentage point increase in obese classmates,
obese girls under the policy have 73.4 more friends, which cancels out
the loss of 20.28 friends at the baseline where there are fewer obese
peers (column 3). Admittedly, these are extreme magnitudes. But the
pattern of signs and statistical significance support the theoretical
prediction that obesity stigma will be mitigated when the underlying
population norm is dominated by obese persons who have difficulty
losing weight (despite the law making it less costly to do so).117
Surprisingly, as white peers increase, obese girls have more friends
116. See, e.g., Andrea D. Powell & Arnold S. Kahn, Racial Differences in Women’s Desire to be
Thin, 17 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 191 (1995); Marisol Perez & Thomas E. Joiner, Jr., Body Image
Dissatisfaction and Disordered Eating in Black and White Women, 33 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 342
(2003); Linda J. Neff et al., Black—White Differences In Body Size Perceptions And Weight
Management Practices Among Adolescent Females, 20 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 459 (1997).
117. These persons would be the “Type IIs” in the separating equilibrium model. See infra Part
III(E).
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under dietary behaviors and nutrition education law. This implies that
some pre-existing norm represented by more white peers counteracts the
law’s average stigma effects.
6. Educational Consequences and Policy Implications
On average, obesity stigma worsens under anti-obesity laws. A
natural question to ask is, so what? Can these stigma effects in high
school translate to welfare losses or worse socioeconomic outcomes in
the long run? To briefly mull possible longer-term implications of these
social norm consequences, I analyze educational attainment as an
exercise. Figure 2 plots the raw distribution (kernel density) of years of
education separately in four groups, by obese or normal weight
classification and by dietary behaviors and nutrition education policy.
The spike at twelve years of education, which most closely corresponds
to a high school diploma, is highest for obese females. At higher years
of education, the kernel densities for obese females are markedly lower
than for normal weight females.
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by this anti-obesity law.
Curiously, education decreases as exposure to white classmates
increases. While anti-obesity law’s relationship with educational
attainment of obese students seems counterintuitive given its opposite
relationship with social stigma, it is not unreasonable that more social
stigma might prompt a positive academic response, and more social
acceptance might prompt a negative academic response.119 For
example, a higher level of stigma could mean fewer social activities and
instead, more time to devote to academics.
Though these findings have mixed policy implications, they remain
important dimensions when evaluating optimal legal rules. First, the
data show that an anti-obesity law can shift norms and further stigmatize
obese girls in school, in terms of poorer social acceptance, fewer friends,
or worse social status. However, the social stigma does not necessarily
translate to worse educational outcomes. In the data, stigma may be
inversely related with educational attainment. If an initial goal of antiobesity law was to promote healthier behaviors for economic purposes,
then the law could also be beneficial if educational attainment improves,
given that more education improves wage outcomes120 as well as health
outcomes.121 On the other hand, other mechanisms may be at play so
that social stigma at school could be less relevant to college attendance.
This does not rule out the idea that obesity stigma in adolescence
could affect one’s future well-being in ways unrelated to college
attendance.
Psychological stress and bullying, including those
associated with weight stigma, might leave lasting impressions into
adulthood.122 Moreover, laws expressing values against obesity could
also encourage negative perceptions that persist over time, which would
do little to lessen the discrimination that obese people already face in
society and the stress that accompanies it.123
In these cases,
implementing anti-bullying legislation to acknowledge weight-based
harassment of children, or anti-discrimination laws that discourage
119. See, e.g., Robert Crosnoe & Chandra Muller, Body Mass Index, Academic Achievement, and
School Context: Examining the Educational Experiences of Adolescent at Risk of Obesity, 45 J. HEALTH
& SOC. BEHAV. 393 (2004); King-To Yeung & John Levi Martin, The Looking Glass Self: An Empirical
Test and Elaboration, 81 SOC. FORCES 843 (2003).
120. See generally David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
LABOR ECONOMICS 1801–63 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds. 1999).
121. See David M. Cutler & Adriana Lleras-Muney, Education and Health: Evaluating Theories
and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econs. Research, Working Paper No.12352, 2006).
122. See, e.g., Stephen Allison et al., Does School Bullying Affect Adult Health? Population
Survey of Health-Related Quality of Life and Past Victimization, 43 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 1163
(2009); Gemma L. Gladstone et al., Do Bullied Children Become Anxious and Depressed Adults?: A
Cross-Sectional Investigation of the Correlates of Bullying and Anxious Depression, 194 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 201 (2006).
123. Cf. Puhl & Heuer, supra note 3.
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weight-based discrimination may be appropriate policy responses to
temper the unintended social norm effects of anti-obesity laws intended
to improve public health. Still, whether or not the law’s social norm
effects translate into wage inequalities and long-term health problems
and what to do about it remain open questions that deserve full
investigation beyond the scope of this Article. Further work is needed
to better understand the long-term consequences of obesity laws and
stigma.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article applies an expressive law and economic framework to
analyze timely concerns about the consequences of obesity laws on
obesity stigma. I find empirical evidence linking stricter anti-obesity
laws with worse obesity stigma, supporting the legal theory that laws
shift social norms and generate stigma by expressing values beyond
their original incentive effects. These analyses and results contribute
much-needed evidence to an area where legal theory is rich but few
empirical studies exist.
Using a unique dataset of social networks in schools, I find that where
dietary education laws are stricter, social stigma increases for the
remaining obese girls, though obesity rates do not decrease. Moreover,
pre-existing norms are important; I find that the law’s expressive role in
obesity stigma can vary by pre-existing peer norms, where being
surrounded by more white or being surrounded by more obese peers can
lessen the social stigma from anti-obesity law. I also find that efforts to
engage in healthier behaviors are slightly greater under more demanding
dietary education mandates, though obesity itself does not decrease.
Together, these results are consistent with a basic economic model of
obesity stigma in which the obese, under anti-obesity laws that
emphasize responsible individual health choices, are negatively
perceived as exerting less effort in their health.
Several insights from this analysis would benefit from further
discussion. This Article has focused on adolescent obesity stigma
associated with state dietary behaviors and nutrition education
mandates, which are useful in testing for expressive effects of the law
generally. There is much room for research on the long-term
consequences of this stigma, as well as developing and testing additional
theories of how social norms might shift, beyond those discussed in this
Article. While this Article has explored the relationship and pathways
between stigma and laws in detail, obtaining rigorous causal estimates,
ideally through randomized experiments or natural experiments, would
be the next step for evidence-based policymaking.
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Importantly, a basic lesson from these results is that a law’s social
norm interactions with vulnerable subgroups, such as obese women, can
be very real and warrant further examination by policymakers. That a
law’s stigma consequences might vary by peer types or pre-existing
norms suggests how complex the interactions can be between laws and
pre-existing norms, cultural or otherwise. Policymakers should more
seriously consider the expressive function of public health laws, the
populations at stake, and the unintended outcomes that such laws may
produce.

APPENDIX
Table 1
Summary Statistics

Variable

Mean

St. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

BMI
Obese
Overweight
Normal
weight
Underweight
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other race
Age
Parent’s
years of
education
Family
income
(thousands)
Parent
married
Northeast
West
Midwest
South
Urban
school
Private
school

22.202
0.099
0.157

4.712
0.299
0.364

13.332
0
0

46.934
1
1

1131
1131
1131

0.699
0.045
0.774
0.075
0.084
0.051
0.016
14.672

0.459
0.208
0.418
0.263
0.278
0.22
0.124
1.72

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
21

1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131
1131

13.96

2.293

8

18

1131

47.534

28.222

0

230

1131

0.787
0.125
0.243
0.467
0.165

0.388
0.33
0.429
0.499
0.371

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

1131
1131
1131
1131
1131

0.755

0.431

0

1

1131

0.245

0.431

0

1

1131
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Large school
School size
% white in
school
% white in
cohort in
school
% obese in
cohort in
school
Number of
students
whom
respondent
named as
her friend
Number of
students
naming
respondent
as friend
Proximity
prestige
Feel socially
accepted
Years of
education
(Wave 3)
Attended
college
(Wave 3)
Earned high
school
diploma
(Wave 3)
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0.416
532.437

0.493
546.114

0
30

1
1744

1131
805

0.701

0.307

0

0.952

1131

0.708

0.321

0

1

1123

0.099

0.07

0

0.5

1131

5.229

2.702

0

10

805

5.647

3.821

0

23

805

0.225

0.126

0.001

0.774

755

4.007

0.802

1

5

1128

13.109

1.719

7

19

1130

0.615

0.487

0

1

1130

0.821

0.384

0

1

1130
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Table 2.
Relationship between Obesity Law and Stigma of
Obese Adolescent Girls
Dependent
Variable
Dietary Behaviors
& Nutrition
Education Law*
Obese
Dietary Behaviors
& Nutrition
Education Law
Obese
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other Race
Age
Parental Education
Family Income
Parents are
Married
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Cohort 4
Cohort 5
Cohort 6
Cohort 7
West
Midwest
South
Urban School
Large school
Constant

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/4

Social
Acceptance

Number of
friends (in)

Number of
friends (out)

Proximity
Prestige

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.467*
(0.194)

1.160
(1.436)

-0.217
(1.344)

0.131
(0.0790)

-0.0225
(0.198)
0.00947
(0.178)
0.306**
(0.0961)
-0.0718
(0.167)
0.178
(0.110)
0.408**
(0.122)
-0.0381
(0.0655)
-0.0453*
(0.0183)
0.00179
(0.00116)

-1.536
(1.409)
-2.969*
(1.446)
1.006**
(0.329)
3.681**
(0.814)
2.861**
(0.507)
5.253**
(0.756)
-0.494**
(0.177)
0.377**
(0.0942)
-0.00482
(0.00552)

-1.185
(0.792)
0.589
(1.265)
-0.510
(0.377)
0.313
(0.594)
-0.104
(0.456)
0.831**
(0.254)
-0.247
(0.230)
0.0435
(0.0289)
0.0108*
(0.00437)

-0.132
(0.106)
-0.136+
(0.0788)
0.0806*
(0.0328)
0.107**
(0.0322)
0.0841**
(0.0262)
0.0248**
(0.00745)
0.00264
(0.00568)
0.00564*
(0.00240)
0.000120
(0.000207)

0.0263
(0.103)
0
(.)
-0.239
(0.336)
-0.401
(0.243)
-0.302
(0.254)
-0.391+
(0.214)
-0.227
(0.260)
-0.335
(0.335)
0.0224
(0.270)
0.282+
(0.152)
-0.0840
(0.123)
-0.521**
(0.177)
-0.00341
(0.221)
5.621**

-0.661
(0.499)
5.767**
(2.134)
0
(.)
1.336**
(0.438)
2.222*
(0.927)
1.892+
(1.056)
2.724**
(0.989)
2.887*
(1.288)
-7.773**
(1.506)
-1.174**
(0.217)
-0.356+
(0.197)
2.328**
(0.358)
0.728
(0.749)
7.001**

-0.105
(0.421)
-1.309
(1.303)
0
(.)
0.0403
(0.660)
-0.459
(1.122)
-0.410
(1.371)
-0.742
(1.190)
-0.454
(1.703)
-4.203**
(1.109)
-1.255**
(0.223)
-2.343**
(0.218)
0.682*
(0.265)
0.853
(0.819)
9.540**

0.00252
(0.0191)
0
(.)
-0.0676
(0.0836)
-0.0231
(0.0910)
-0.105
(0.0712)
-0.108
(0.0700)
-0.106
(0.0652)
-0.102
(0.0630)
-0.334**
(0.116)
-0.0230
(0.0257)
0.00816
(0.0214)
0.126**
(0.0334)
-0.0748+
(0.0396)
0.273
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R-squared
Observations
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(1.105)
0.107
999

(2.000)
0.264
692

(2.981)
0.187
692

215
(0.227)
0.570
646

**1%; *5%; +10% significance. Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are shown in
parentheses. All estimates use longitudinal survey weights and adjust for stratified sampling according
to region.
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Table 3
Robustness Checks for the Influence of Obesity Laws on Obesity
Stigma: The Influence of Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition Education
Laws on Social Acceptance
Dependent variable: Social Acceptance
(1)
Dietary
Behaviors &

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.449**

-0.467*

-0.533*

-0.452*

-0.0549**

Nutrition
Education
Law*Obesity

(0.102)

(0.194)

(0.236)

(0.197)

(0.0180)

Obesity
measure
Include
school
covariates
and cohorts?
Control for
Tax?
Control for %
Obese in
School?
R-squared
N

Dummy

Dummy

Dummy

Dummy

BMI

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
No

No
No

Yes
No

No
Yes

No
No

0.056
999

0.107
999

0.112
999

0.108
999

0.111
999

**1%; *5%; +10% significance. Coefficients shown are on state laws interacted with obesity during
Wave 1 (1994–1995). Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are in parentheses.
Regressions include controls for race, age, parental years of education, family income, marital status of
parental respondent, and flags for imputed values of the latter three. “Tax” refers to the state cigarette
tax rate as of 1995. School covariates include school size, public or private status, urbanicity, region,
and cohort indicators.
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Table 4
Relationship between Cigarette Taxes and Stigma of
Obese Adolescent Girls
Dependent variable

Cigarette Tax*BMI
Cigarette Tax
BMI
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other Race
Age
Parental Education
Family Income
Parents are Married
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Cohort 4
Cohort 5
Cohort 6
Cohort 7

Social
Acceptance

Number of
friends (in)

Number of
friends (out)

Proximity
Prestige

(1)
0.000582+
(0.000319)
-0.0153*
(0.00756)
-0.0258+
(0.0143)
0.208+
(0.124)
0.0524
(0.178)
0.207+
(0.112)
0.428**
(0.127)
-0.0468
(0.0616)
-0.0195
(0.0257)
0.00147+
(0.000837)
-0.0362
(0.0894)
0
(.)
-0.0571
(0.359)
-0.199
(0.295)
-0.140
(0.250)
-0.185
(0.224)
-0.0535
(0.228)
-0.122
(0.266)

(2)
0.000756
(0.00214)
-0.0885
(0.0604)
-0.147*
(0.0658)
-0.521
(0.491)
0.980
(1.207)
0.543
(1.200)
5.273**
(0.602)
-0.491**
(0.168)
0.122
(0.149)
0.00728
(0.00800)
-1.085*
(0.501)
0
(.)
-4.293**
(1.238)
-2.666*
(1.079)
-1.680
(1.102)
-2.324*
(1.053)
-1.786
(1.152)
-1.274
(1.202)

(3)
0.00162
(0.00158)
-0.0803+
(0.0468)
-0.0441
(0.0416)
-0.604
(0.396)
0.432
(0.366)
-0.173
(0.423)
0.726**
(0.265)
-0.308*
(0.152)
-0.0157
(0.0535)
0.00754
(0.00513)
-0.153
(0.323)
0
(.)
0.0984
(0.986)
0.417
(1.017)
0.751
(0.690)
0.828
(0.738)
0.483
(0.672)
0.754
(1.027)

(4)
-0.0000247
(0.0000350)
-0.00346
(0.00276)
-0.00121
(0.00115)
0.0343
(0.0396)
0.0415
(0.0363)
0.0330
(0.0557)
0.0273**
(0.00561)
-0.00382
(0.00387)
-0.00281
(0.00532)
0.000444+
(0.000242)
-0.0190
(0.0124)
0.0426
(0.0359)
-0.0211
(0.0302)
0.0296
(0.0305)
-0.0199
(0.0142)
-0.0271*
(0.0106)
-0.0204*
(0.00954)
0
(.)
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West
Midwest
South
Urban School
Private School
Large school
Constant
R-squared
Observations

-0.126
(0.142)
0.106
(0.0944)
0.119
(0.120)
0
(.)
0.208
(0.127)
-0.0871
(0.179)
5.591**
(1.485)
0.067
1127

[VOL. 81

-1.157
(1.127)
0.257
(0.921)
-2.108*
(0.966)
2.340**
(0.689)

-1.372**
(0.510)
-0.293
(0.676)
-2.165**
(0.716)
1.876**
(0.502)

0.00445
(0.0558)
0.0739
(0.0653)
-0.146+
(0.0849)
0.153*
(0.0643)

-1.581+
(0.857)
18.49**
(3.613)
0.202
805

-1.359**
(0.496)
11.29**
(2.625)
0.149
805

-0.234**
(0.0762)
0.426*
(0.167)
0.487
755

**1%; *5%; +10% significance. Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are shown in
parentheses. All estimates use longitudinal survey weights and adjust for stratified sampling according
to region.
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Table 5
Relationship between Obesity Laws and Effort

Dietary Behaviors &
Nutrition Education
Law
Control for Cigarette
Tax?
R-squared
N

Number of Days Last
Week Ate Breakfast
(1)
(2)
1.920**
2.135**
(0.477)
(0.392)

N
0.122
1023

Y
0.124
1023

Physically fit
(3)
0.0128
(0.0725)

(4)
-0.0536
(0.0344)

N
0.072
1021

Y
0.076
1021

Table 6
Relationship between Obesity Laws and Obesity Probability

Dietary Behaviors &
Nutrition Education
Law

Obese, 1994-1995
(1)
(2)
0.0633
0.126*
(0.106)
(0.0530)

Obese, 1996
(3)
(4)
0.0268
0.103
(0.133)
(0.0756)

0.00377*
(0.00166)
0.048
1983

0.00449*
(0.00212)
0.061
1020

Cigarette Tax
R-squared
N

0.038
1983

0.050
1020

**1%; *5%; +10% significance. Coefficients shown are on state dietary behaviors and nutrition
education policies and state cigarette tax rates. Robust standard errors are clustered by school and are
shown in parentheses. All regressions include controls for race, age, parental years of education, family
income, marital status of parental respondent, and flags for imputed values of the latter three. School
covariates include school size, public or private status, urbanicity, and region. Data are from the Add
Health saturated sample and are restricted to women. All estimates use longitudinal survey weights and
adjust for stratified sampling according to region.
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Table 7
Do Influences of Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition Education Law on
Obesity Stigma Vary by Pre-Existing Norms?

Law*Obese
Law*Obese*%White
Obese*%White
Law*Obese*%Obese
Obese*%Obese
Obese
Law
% White
Law*%White
%Obese
Law*%Obese
R-squared
N

(1)

(2)

Socially
Accepted
0.667
(0.484)
-1.352
(0.956)
0.166
(0.480)
-0.164
(3.937)
2.193
(1.996)
-0.322
(0.290)
-1.402**
(0.462)
-0.925*
(0.407)
1.559**
(0.501)
-1.742
(1.766)
1.970
(2.051)
0.130
994

Number of
Friends (in)
-10.91*
(5.249)
16.19**
(4.493)
-3.315**
(1.130)
-18.07
(14.94)
11.26
(7.463)
-1.976*
(0.897)
0.779
(5.224)
1.142
(4.116)
-2.575
(5.398)
-20.89**
(2.622)
7.091
(6.322)
0.301
691

(3)
Number of
Friends
(out)
-20.28*
(9.761)
15.21+
(8.467)
-3.646**
(0.434)
73.40*
(30.53)
6.395+
(3.792)
1.952**
(0.442)
-0.183
(3.540)
0.895
(3.567)
-2.143
(3.861)
-12.78**
(2.427)
10.50**
(3.120)
0.226
691

(4)
Proximity
Prestige
-0.239
(0.182)
0.580**
(0.111)
-0.194**
(0.0147)
-0.711
(0.865)
1.535**
(0.143)
-0.206**
(0.0188)
0.0499
(0.219)
0.0203
(0.124)
-0.286
(0.191)
-1.728**
(0.159)
1.674**
(0.280)
0.697
645

**1%; *5%; +10% significance. “Law” is a dummy variable for whether the state requires dietary
behaviors & nutrition education.
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Table 8
Obesity Law’s stigma roles in educational attainment
Dependent variable

Years of Education

Attended College

High School Diploma

(1)

(2)

(4)

(5)

Cohort Measure

% white

% obese

% white

% obese

Law*Obese*Cohort

-0.881
(0.652)

9.362
(6.076)

-1.010*
(0.399)

-2.222+
(1.244)

-0.725*
(0.326)

1.462
(1.327)

Law*Obese

1.054*
(0.464)

-0.815
(0.796)

0.554*
(0.245)

0.216
(0.140)

0.523*
(0.225)

-0.184
(0.191)

Obese*Cohort

-0.209
(0.352)

-2.065
(3.808)

0.385**
(0.107)

1.185**
(0.346)

0.140
(0.129)

-0.612
(0.419)

Law*Cohort

1.272
(1.010)

-2.802
(3.226)

0.673**
(0.250)

-0.193
(0.741)

1.258**
(0.292)

-0.118
(0.441)

Law

-1.529+

-0.607

-0.515*

-0.0274

-1.377**

-0.372*

(0.922)

(0.597)

(0.214)

(0.194)

(0.257)

(0.170)

-0.443**

-0.305

-0.0977+

-0.189*

-0.100

0.0180

(0.130)

(0.520)

(0.0535)

(0.0735)

(0.0618)

(0.0677)

-1.887*
(0.872)
0.247

1.546
(2.449)
0.239

-0.529**
(0.196)
0.230

0.331
(0.227)
0.224

-0.616**
(0.164)
0.342

0.531**
(0.202)
0.311

996

1001

996

1001

996

1001

Obese
Cohort
R-squared
N
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Table 9
State Anti-Obesity Laws and Cigarette Excise Tax Rates
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/4

Tax
(cents per pack)
16.5
29
58
31.5
37
20
50
24
65
33.9
12
60
28
44
15.5
36
24
3
20
37
36
51
75
48
18
17
18
34
35
25
40
21
56

Dietary Behaviors & Nutrition
Education Required?
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
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North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
State average
Federal excise tax
Combined federal
and state average

LAWS AND SOCIAL NORMS
5
44
24
23
38
31
61
7
33
13
41
26.5
44
2.5
81.5
17
44
12
32.7
24
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Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

56.7
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